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Asynchronous circuits have several advantages for security applications, in particular their good re-
sistance to attacks. In this paper, we report on experiments with modeling, at various abstraction
levels, a patented asynchronous circuit for detecting physical attacks, such as cutting wires or pro-
ducing short-circuits.
1 Introduction
The number of connected devices that make up the IoT (Internet of Things) already exceeded 20 billion,
and is constantly increasing. However, a study of Hewlett Packard1 indicates that 90% of the objects
collect and thus potentially expose data, that 80% of the objects do not use identification and source
authentication mechanisms, and that 70% do not use a mechanism of encrypting the transmitted data.
These vulnerabilities open the way to DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks, which exploit over
100,000 infected devices (e.g., cameras, video recorders, etc.) to overload various services and websites
with a deluge of data. Therefore, strengthening the security of connected devices is a critical issue.
The SECURIOT-2 project2, led by Tiempo Secure, aims at developing a SMCU (Secure Micro-
Controller Unit) that will bring to the IoT a level of security similar to banking transactions and transport
(smart cards) and identification (electronic passports). Besides ensuring the necessary security services
(key management, authentication, confidentiality and integrity of stored/exchanged data), the SMCU
needs a power management scheme adequate with the low power consumption constraints of the IoT.
Given these constraints, a natural implementation of an SMCU is by means of asynchronous circuits,
whose components are not governed by a clock signal, but operate independently, on an ”on-demand”
basis. Compared to classical synchronous circuits, this functioning has the potential for lower power
dissipation, more harmonious electromagnetic emission, and better overall timing performance.
In this paper, we study the so-called shield [25, 26], a particular asynchronous circuit designed and
patented by Tiempo Secure for the protection of another (asynchronous) circuit against certain physical
attacks (e.g., cutting a wire, setting a wire to a constant voltage, and introducing a short-circuit between
two wires). The behavior of asynchronous circuits can be suitably modeled in the action-based setting,
using the composition operators of process calculi, as witnessed by CHP [21], Tangram [4], Balsa [10],
which are all inspired by CSP [6], and have been successfully applied to design asynchronous circuits,
∗Institute of Engineering Univ. Grenoble Alpes
1https://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-news/press-release.html?id=1909050
2http://www.pole-scs.org/en/projects/securiot-2
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Figure 1: Shield: serial pipelined composition of sequencers
e.g., [2, 22, 24]. All these approaches are equipped with a compilation scheme [21], producing QDI
(Quasi-Delay-Insensitive) circuits, the correct operation of which is independent of the delay in operators
(or logical gates) and wires, except for certain wires that form isochronic forks [21]. An isochronic fork
is a wire connecting an emitter to several receivers, which receive any signal with identical delays.
We consider the modeling and analysis of the shield at two abstraction levels. First, at circuit level,
we take into account only the components of the circuit and their interconnection, without modeling the
implementation details of these components. This level is appropriate for reasoning about the desired
properties of the shield, namely the detection of physical attacks. The regular structure of the shield
(serial pipeline) enables to apply inductive arguments to reduce all possible attack configurations to a
finite set, which we analyzed exhaustively. Next, we undertake a gate level modeling, focusing on the
implementation of a component in terms of logical gates. Here we explore a range of different modeling
variants for gates, electric wires, and forks (isochronic or not), and analyze their respective impact on
the faithfulness of the global circuit model, the size of the underlying state spaces, the expression of
correctness properties, and the overall ease of verification. We also point out that certain modeling
variants lead to deadlocks in the circuit.
In this study, we mainly use the modern LNT [13] language for concurrent systems, which offers a
user-friendly syntax and a formal semantics inherited from process calculi, and has been shown to be
close to industrial hardware description languages for asynchronous circuits [5]. For the modeling of
attacks, we also use the synchronization vectors of EXP [20], which operate on networks of commu-
nicating automata. LNT and EXP are input languages of the CADP toolbox [12]3 for modeling and
verification of asynchronous concurrent systems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the protection circuit and its behavior. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 are devoted to the analysis of the protection circuit at two abstraction levels (circuit-level
and gate-level, respectively), in regard to its properties of detecting physical attacks. Both sections il-
lustrate the approach on examples; the full models can be found in the appendices. Section 5 discusses
related work and Section 6 gives concluding remarks and directions for future work.
2 Shield
To protect an integrated circuit against physical attacks, the patent [25, 26] suggests to add as a top layer
a particular electric circuit, called shield in the sequel. Physical attacks to the circuit are generally meant
to allow the attacker to probe for the sensitive information that is stored in the internal registers/wires of
the circuit during its ordinary operation. These probing procedures will inevitably lead to a tampering
with the shield as it constitutes the top layer of the accessible part of the circuit. Hence, proving that the
shield is able to flag any tampering attempts amounts to proving that the circuit itself is able to detect a
physical attack and to stop its normal operation and take an appropriate countermeasure (e.g., completely
deactivate the circuit).
3http://cadp.inria.fr
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Figure 2: Gate-level design of a sequencer
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Figure 3: Behavior of a sequencer
A shield is a serial composition of n+ 1 sequencers (see Fig. 1 or [26, Fig. 3]), or even a parallel
composition of several series of sequencers (see [26, Figs. 9–11]). Each sequencer transmits a first
signal, called request to its successor; when the last sequencer outputs a request, a second signal, called
acknowledgment is transmitted through the series of sequencers in the opposite direction. If a sequencer
is designed in such a way that any physical modification on the connections for the transmission of the
request (respectively, the acknowledgment) blocks the transmission of the acknowledgment (respectively,
the request), a physical attack can be detected by the absence of an acknowledgment for a request sent
into the shield.
Figure 2 shows the gate-level design of a circuit presented as a possible implementation of a se-
quencer in the patent.4 The intended evolution over time of the circuit [26, Figs. 4–8] is summarized by
the table in Fig. 3a. When considering only the externally visible wires, the behavior of a sequencer cor-
responds to the automaton shown in Fig. 3b, where input (respectively, output) transitions are depicted
with plain (respectively, dotted) arrows. Initially, the output G of the Muller C element [23] and the two
inputs R_PRED and A_SUCC are DOWN. When input R_PRED goes UP, output R_SUCC goes UP as well. As
a reaction, input A_SUCC is expected to go UP, triggering output R_SUCC to go DOWN. When A_SUCC goes
DOWN, output A_PRED goes UP. Finally, R_PRED goes DOWN, bringing the circuit back to its initial state.
This cycle is related to the so-called four-phase handshake protocol, frequently used in the design of
asynchronous circuits [21]. Note that there is no constraint on reaction delays of the circuit: a change of
an input should be eventually followed by the corresponding output change. Similarly, the environment
of the circuit should respect the protocol by reacting to a change of an output by changing an input as
specified by the protocol.
4There are small differences with [26, Figs. 4–8]: (1) omission of the input RST to the Muller C element; (2) no distinction
between links carrying 0 (dashed in [26]) and 1 (plain in [26]); (3) naming forks and highlighting them (in yellow); (4) explicit
drawing of the fork Z after the inverter; and (5) labeling of the visible and internal wires.
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3 Circuit-level Analysis of the Shield
3.1 Modeling a Serial Shield
Considering a sequencer as a black-box, its behavior can be defined in the LNT modeling language [13]
by the following process:
process PROTOCOL [R_PRED , A_PRED, R_SUCC , A_SUCC: LINK] is
loop
R_PRED (UP); R_SUCC (UP); A_SUCC (UP); R_SUCC (DOWN);
A_SUCC (DOWN); A_PRED (UP); R_PRED (DOWN); A_PRED (DOWN)
end loop
end process
This process interacts with its environment on four LNT gates (R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC, and A_SUCC),
each of which is a channel carrying a voltage (DOWN or UP). The LTS (Labeled Transition System) gener-
ated for process PROTOCOL is exactly the automaton shown in Figure 3b.
Composition of sequencers in the manner of a pipeline as shown in Fig. 1 yields a model of a (serial)
shield. To ease the iterative construction of such sequence, we choose the EXP language [20] to define
a composition operator pipe(C1,C2) to pipe two sequencers C1 and C2 stored in the files "C1.bcg" and
"C2.bcg":
hide R, A in
par R, A in
rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in "C1.bcg" end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in "C2.bcg" end rename
end par
Supposing that C1 and C2 both have the set {R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC, A_SUCC} of observable gates, pipe
renames the right-hand (respectively, left-hand) side gates ofC1 (respectively, C2) into a pair of new gates
{R, A}, on which C1 and C2 are synchronized. Hiding R and A in the composition ensures then that the
observable gates of pipe(C1,C2) are once more {R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC, A_SUCC}. Thus, pipe can be
easily extended to series of sequencers, by defining pipe0(S) = S and pipen+1(P) = pipe
(
P,pipen(P)
)
.
Letting P stand for the LTS of process PROTOCOL, equivalence checking (e.g., using BISIMULA-
TOR [3]) shows that pipe(P,P)≡ P, where ≡ denotes equivalence with respect to divergence-sensitive
branching bisimulation. It follows by a straightforward induction that:
(∀n ∈N) pipen(P)≡ P (1)
3.2 Modeling Attacks
Intuitively, a physical attack on the shield corresponds to a modified composition of some sequencers,
which can be represented by a modification of the composition operator. The attacks can be grouped
into two classes: those that impact the interface between two sequencers, and those that impact more
than two sequencers. If an attack can be expressed using operations for which divergence-sensitive
branching bisimulation is a congruence, then it is sufficient to analyze this attack on any pair (or triple)
of sequencers in a pipeline, because any non-trivial sequence of correctly pipelined sequencers can be
reduced to a single sequencer. In this section, we will present only one example of each class of attacks;
a more complete treatment can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Serial pipeline of three sequencers
3.2.1 Attacks impacting two sequencers: wire cuts and stuck at a constant
Forcing a wire W to a constant value V can be represented by allowing only V as value during each
rendezvous on the LNT gate W. Using the constraint-oriented specification style favored by the multi-
way rendezvous [6, 15, 27, 14], it is sufficient to add a parallel process, which continuously accepts a
rendezvous on W with value V:
process STUCKAT [W: LINK] (V: VOLTAGE) is
loop
W (V)
end loop
end process
There are two possibilities to modify the composition operator: either both sequencers are synchronized
with process STUCKAT, or only the sequencer receiving on W (i.e., the right-hand side sequencer C2 for
gate R, and the left-hand sequencer C1 for gate A). The latter is expressed by the following composition
expression in EXP, where file "STUCKAT_UP.bcg" contains the LTS of process STUCKAT [W] (UP):
hide R, A in
par
A -> rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in "C1.bcg" end rename
|| R, A -> rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in "C2.bcg" end rename
|| R -> rename W -> R in "STUCKAT_UP.bcg" end rename
end par
Note that "C1.bcg" can always perform a rendezvous on R, without any constraint on the value.
A wire-cut can be handled similarly to a wire stuck at a constant: any rendezvous is blocked when
synchronizing with the deadlocking process stop (rather than STUCKAT), and any rendezvous is enabled
by simply desynchronizing the two sequencers.
3.2.2 Attacks impacting more than two sequencers: short-circuits
For a series of three sequencers as shown in Fig. 4, there are six possible short-circuits around the
sequencer S1: R1-R2, R1-A1, R2-A1, R2-A2, A1-A2, and A1-R2.5 The definition of a composition operator
modeling a short-circuit requires the use of synchronization vectors, to properly handle any disagreement
between the value exchanged during the rendezvous. The most generic way to cope with these situations
is to consider the resulting value to be non-deterministic. Another, more constrained modeling option
would be to enforce a majority-based policy (in a three-party rendezvous with two possible values, there
is always a majority).
The following composition EXP expression models a short-circuit between R1 and A2:
5The short-circuits R1-A1 and R2-A2 are similar in the sense that they could both be defined by the same attack for a series
of only two sequencers.
R. Mateescu, W. Serwe, A. Bouzafour & M. Renaudin 205
hide R1 , A2 , R2, A2, R1A2 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "A1 !UP",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in "C1.bcg" end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"C2.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in "C3.bcg" end rename
end par
There are two kinds of rules for unmodified wires: there is no synchronization for those externally visible
(R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC, and A_SUCC), and a binary synchronization for the remaining ones (A1 and R2).
For the three-party rendezvous of the short-circuit (in the example between R1 and A2), a new gate R1A2
is introduced; the voltage on R1A2 is non-deterministic if and only if there is disagreement on the voltage.
3.2.3 Circuit-Level Analysis Results
The SVL (Script Verification Language) [11] script given in Appendix C automates the circuit-level
validation of the shield. To show that the shield detects an attack, we check whether the expected behavior
(see Fig. 3b) is included in the model generated for the corresponding attack.
All attacks forcing a wire to a constant value are detected. A wire-cut might be left undetected only if
the attack is modeled such that the gates on both ends of the wire are free to perform arbitrary rendezvous
on the gate without ever synchronizing, which is not a realistic assumption. All short-circuits but R1-A1
and R2-A2 are detected. This can be explained by the fact that these short-circuits cut the pipe-line of
sequencers, reducing them to a shorter shield, keeping the same functionality. However, because the
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electric connections for R and A are located in different layers of the chip [25, 26], attacking the chip in
this way is impossible (without damaging the entire chip).
Because attacks are modeled by operators congruent for branching bisimulation, these results ex-
tend to a series of N sequencers. Indeed, using equation (1) any non-trivial series of sequencers can be
replaced by a single sequencer, so that any (single) attack can be reduced to one of the studied configu-
rations with two or three sequencers.
4 Gate-level Analysis
For a more precise study of a sequencer, we refine the model of a sequencer by representing the internal
operation of all the electric wires and gates according to Fig. 2: one binary wire, three forks, one inverter,
one AND gate, one NOR gate, and one Muller C element. Intuitively, each of them can be considered as
a process, which reacts on its input(s) by (possibly) producing some output. However, there are various
possibilities with respect to the degree of synchronization and possible propagation delays. This section
aims at exploring these possibilities, discussing the respective advantages in terms of ease of modeling,
size of the corresponding state space, and practicality for verification.
A major choice when modeling a gate is whether the model represents only transitions (i.e., changing
voltage, as in the protocol of Fig. 3b) or rather current state of a wire. Considering only transitions yields
smaller models and corresponding state spaces, but might seem less intuitive because it requires stronger
assumptions (e.g., synchronous communication).
4.1 Modeling Wires and Forks
A wire can be modeled in essentially two ways: as an LNT gate or as an instance of the LNT process
process WIRE [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] is
var X : VOLTAGE in
loop
INPUT (?X); OUTPUT (X)
end loop
end var
end process
Representing a wire by an LNT gate models the immediate transmission from the input to the output,
whereas the LNT process models the possibility of a communication delay, because other actions of the
circuit might be interleaved between the input and the output. Notice that (similar to [19]) process WIRE
enforces alternation, i.e., it only accepts the next input after it has delivered the output.
A fork is a wire with more than one output, and can also be modeled as a gate (using a multi-way
rendezvous [6, 15, 27, 14]), faithfully representing isochronic forks [18]. It is also possible to model a
fork as a dedicated process. However, as there is more than one output, it is possible to specify their
order of occurrence, from simultaneous (using a multi-way rendezvous for the outputs) to unspecified
(using a parallel composition). The latter option is modeled by the LNT process
process FORK [INPUT , OUTPUT1 , OUTPUT2: LINK] is
var X : VOLTAGE in
loop
INPUT (?X);
par
OUTPUT1 (X)
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|| OUTPUT2 (X)
end par
end loop
end var
end process
To ensure a correct functioning of an asynchronous circuit, some forks must be assumed to be
isochronic. An isochronic fork can be modeled using the process WIRE, using a multi-way rendezvous on
gate OUTPUT (similar to [18]).
Notice that all these models of wires and forks are valid for both the transition and state oriented
style, because they do not have a memory about the last transmitted value.
4.2 Modeling a Sequencer
Supposing that we have LNT processes modeling gates, the sequencer of Fig. 2 can be modeled by
a spectrum of possibilities, considering the options of modeling wires and forks. A first model using
multi-way rendezvous for wires and forks is:
process SEQUENCER_RV [R_PRED , A_PRED , R_SUCC , A_SUCC, G, H: LINK]
(X1 , X2 , INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED, A_SUCC , G -> MULLER [R_PRED , A_SUCC, G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED, H -> AND [R_PRED , H, R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G, H -> INV [G, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC, H -> NOR [A_SUCC , H, A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
end par
end process
On the other extreme, the following LNT process represents wires and forks as explicit processes,
and all its forks but Z are isochronic:
process SEQUENCER_IIP [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G2 , H1 , H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED2 , H1 -> AND [R_PRED2 , H1 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED2 -> WIRE [R_PRED, R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC2 -> WIRE [A_SUCC, A_SUCC2]
|| H, H1 , H2 -> FORK [H, H1 , H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
Models for other combinations are given in Appendix A.5.
4.3 Modeling Gates
We illustrate the various ways to model gates on the binary AND gate; models of the other gates are given
in Appendix A. Fig. 5 shows various (state-oriented) bodies that can replace “...” in the LNT process
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loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select;
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
(a) intuitive
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
[] OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end select
end loop
(d) free
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1);
select
null
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select
[] INPUT2 (?X2);
select
null
[] INPUT1 (?X1)
end select
end select;
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
(b) state-oriented
loop
par
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] null
end select
|| select
INPUT2 (?X2)
[] null
end select
end par;
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
(c) parallel
Figure 5: State-oriented models of a binary AND gate
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
...
end process
The most intuitive model is state-oriented and shown in Fig. 5(a). It reacts to a rendezvous on one of
its inputs with a rendezvous on its output. An issue with Fig. 5(a) is that it requires an output to occur
between any two inputs, but it might be the case that the inputs arrive almost simultaneously. This issue
is addressed by Fig. 5(b), which may accept one or two inputs in an arbitrary order before generating
an output. Using a parallel composition operator, Fig. 5(b) can be simplified to Fig. 5(c). Fig. 5(c) has
the inconvenient that it might generate outputs that are not triggered by an input. Permitting also that an
input might not generate an output, one obtains Fig. 5(d), which is always ready to accept a new input or
to (re)generate the current output.
A transition-oriented model of a gate must generate an output in reaction to a change in one of the
inputs if and only if the output changes. This requires to remember the previous output, as in the process:
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
var RESULT , NEW_RESULT: VOLTAGE in
RESULT := X1 AND X2;
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select;
NEW_RESULT := X1 AND X2;
if NEW_RESULT != RESULT then
RESULT := NEW_RESULT;
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end if
end loop
R. Mateescu, W. Serwe, A. Bouzafour & M. Renaudin 209
end var
end process
4.4 Gate-level Analysis Results
We used the Grid’5000 platform to generate the state spaces for one and two sequencers, using various
combinations of the modeling choices discussed previously. Table 1 summarizes the results. The first
column indicates the model of gates: INTUITIVE, STATE, PARALLEL, and FREE refer respectively to
the state-oriented style of Fig. 5(a), (b), (c), and (d), and TRANSITION refers to the transition-oriented
style (see Sect. 4.3). The second column indicates the model of wires and forks: RV indicates that wires
and forks are modeled by a rendezvous, and a triple F1F2F3 (with Fi ∈ {I,P}) indicates the isochrony of
the three forks (X, Y, and Z in Fig. 2) in a sequencer (I stands for an isochronic fork, and P for a non-
isochronic one); in all cases but for RV, wires are modeled as separate processes. The third and fourth
columns indicate the size of one sequencer, minimized for divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation
(after hiding all gates but R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC, and A_SUCC). The fifth and sixth columns indicate
the size of one sequencer with stubs (generating input according to the protocol and absorbing repeated
outputs, see Appendix A.4), minimized for divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation. The seventh
column indicates whether a sequencer with stubs contains a deadlock (after minimizing for branching
bisimulation to remove livelocks masking deadlocks). The eighth and nineth columns indicate the size
of a pipeline of two sequencers (not minimized for branching bisimulation), whenever the composition
was possible. The last column indicates whether the model of two sequencers contains a deadlock. The
most time-consuming task is the (explicit) generation of the LTS for the composition of two sequencers:
depending on the model, this step takes from five seconds to more than several days.6
A first observation is that explicitly modeling wires and forks increases the size of the models by
several orders of magnitude (compared to models RV). Also, the state-oriented (other than FREE)models
are significantly larger then the transition-oriented one.
A second observation is the presence of deadlocks in some compositions of two sequencers. For in-
stance, in the INTUITIVE model with wires and forks represented by LNT gates using rendezvous (RV),
the following sequence of rendezvous leads to the deadlock: "R_PRED !UP", "R !UP", "R_SUCC !UP",
"G_L !DOWN", "G_R !DOWN", "A_SUCC !UP", "R_PRED !UP". The deadlock can be explained by the fact
that the composition of two sequencers contains a cycle (formed by the (forking) wires R, G_R, H_R, A,
G_L, H_L)7, which can absorb only a bounded number of inputs (R_PRED and A_SUCC). Because each input
must be absorbed twice by the cycle (e.g., R_PRED has to alternate with both R and G_L and in the trace
above), the cycle can fill if inputs arrive faster than outputs (R_SUCC and A_PRED) are generated. We
deduce that the INTUITIVE model is not appropriate. We also observe that the presence of deadlocks
in the TRANSITION models can be used to pinpoint the forks that need not to be isochronic; this pro-
vides a valuable information to the hardware designer about possible substantial optimizations in area
and performance.
A third observation is that, contrary to the circuit-level model, the composition of two sequencers
in the gate-level models is not equivalent to a single sequencer, so that there is no counterpart to the
induction result of Section 3. However, when constraining the visible actions (R_PRED, A_PRED, R_SUCC,
and A_SUCC) by appropriate stubs eliminating repeated actions (see Appendix A.4), we observe that a
6For the missing results for models STATE and PARALLEL, the generation was stopped after 62 hours, at which point
each composition had required already 150 GB of RAM and produced a file of more than 100 GB. We also experimented with
distributed generation, using up to 80 processors; this also failed due to a lack of disk space (more than 4 TB).
7See Appendix B.1 for the corresponding composition expression.
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model forks one sequencer one sequencer with stubs two sequencers
states transitions states transitions lock states transitions lock
RV 90 222 8 8 no 308 790 yes
III 2,586 7,922 8 8 no 288,771 1,093,552 yes
IIP 6,124 21,454 8 8 no 1,307,889 5,968,266 yes
IPI 6,475 19,985 1,444 4,141 yes 2,588,785 10,624,729 yes
IN
T
U
IT
IV
E
IPP 15,422 54,969 4,780 15,402 yes 12,433,518 61,288,551 yes
PII 6,475 19,985 1,444 4,141 yes 1,562,907 6,452,580 yes
PIP 15,422 54,969 4,780 15,402 yes 7,291,527 36,213,052 yes
PPI 14,900 46,486 4,032 13,710 yes 13,450,533 59,014,624 yes
PPP 38,680 139,558 14,273 53,496 yes 76,518,596 400,442,323 yes
RV 766 2,406 8 8 no 230,906 906,342 no
III 33,258 127,380 8 8 no 474,187,601 2,514,512,879 no
IIP 86,846 374,292 8 8 no 3,002,896,049 18,494,246,894 no
IPI 82,041 315,312 32,990 113,773 no 2,780,162,577 15,419,740,546 no
S
T
A
T
E
IPP 216,470 931,696 89,238 339,090 no
PII 82,041 315,312 32,990 113,773 no 2,795,890,977 15,509,939,437 no
PIP 216,470 931,696 89,238 339,090 no
PPI 194,738 752,128 82,020 316,170 no
PPP 531,576 2,287,840 238,574 1,000,138 no
RV 916 3,404 8 16 no 342,674 1,625,792 no
III 54,394 258,456 8 16 no 1,308,613,124 8,868,967,479 no
IIP 146,002 734,800 8 16 no 8,464,022,990 61,740,118,299 no
IPI 127,578 606,064 72,431 301,189 no 6,962,294,015 48,364,449,041 no
PA
R
A
L
L
E
L
IPP 339,047 1,704,667 194,704 854,767 no
PII 127,578 606,064 72,431 301,189 no 7,000,306,907 48,656,915,179 no
PIP 339,047 1,704,667 194,704 854,767 no
PPI 292,906 1,391,688 173,252 1,115,840 no
PPP 778,468 3,913,592 474,676 2,254,762 no
RV 24 186 8 16 no 567 6,517 no
III 384 2,664 8 16 no 147,360 1,602,532 no
IIP 768 5,544 8 16 no 589,440 6,741,584 no
IPI 764 5,306 7,145 37,733 no 583,560 6,500,110 no
F
R
E
E
IPP 1,528 11,040 14,346 80,865 no 2,334,240 27,307,944 no
PII 764 5,306 7,145 37,733 no 582,224 6,485,364 no
PIP 1,528 11,040 14,346 80,865 no 2,328,896 27,245,680 no
PPI 1,520 10,568 15,764 90,732 no 2,310,400 26,344,640 no
PPP 3,040 21,984 33,774 206,894 no 9,241,600 110,534,400 no
RV 34 112 8 8 no 279 1,101 no
III 496 1,614 8 8 no 34,461 153,267 no
IIP 1,320 4,870 8 8 no 238,811 1,270,154 no
IPI 952 3,155 702 2,077 yes 136,092 665,059 yes
T
R
A
N
S
IT
IO
N
IPP 2,475 9,313 1,938 6,525 yes 912,702 5,269,597 yes
PII 952 3,155 702 2,077 yes 135,814 666,185 yes
PIP 2,475 9,313 1,938 6,525 yes 911,332 5,263,119 yes
PPI 1,814 6,104 1,335 8,233 yes 537,434 2,855,374 yes
PPP 4,712 17,972 4,789 18,942 yes 3,624,160 22,403,699 yes
Table 1: State spaces for various gate-level models of up to two sequencers
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sequencer is branching bisimilar to the protocol if and only if the forks X and Y are both isochronic (i.e.,
models RV, III, and IIP).8 Hence, the LNTmodel is useful to determine whether a fork must be isochronic
(this is the case for X and Y for the sequencer) or not (this is the case for Z, and formally justifies why Z
is represented differently than X and Y in [26, Figs. 4–8].
Theoretically, attacks could be analyzed as described in Sect. 3.2 for circuit-level models. However,
because the state spaces of gate-level models are much larger, we did not yet attempt this.
5 Related Work
Process calculi, that were initially designed for concurrent systems, are natural candidates for describing
asynchronous circuits.
CSPM, a machine-readable dialect of CSP, was used in [18] to model various asynchronous circuits
(C element, n-way mutual exclusion element, tree arbiter) and verify them using the FDR tool. The CSP
operators were shown to be suitable for asynchronous circuits, in particular multi-way synchronization
facilitates the modeling of isochronic forks. A general model for asynchronous circuits and its translation
to CSP is proposed in [31], together with a compositional verification approach suitable for FDR. This
makes possible a modeling at three levels (Balsa, handshake expansion, and gate-level), and was applied
to the design of realistic circuits, such as the AMULET processor [30].
A modeling style for asynchronous circuits in CCS was proposed in [28] and illustrated on dis-
tributed arbiters. In [19] it is shown how to represent DI (Delay-Insensitive) asynchronous circuits in
CCS. A circuit C was defined as DI if its composition with a FRW (Foam Rubber Wrapper) making the
communications on input and output wires arbitrarily long is equivalent to C modulo the MUST-testing
equivalence, provided by the Concurrency Workbench [8].
The modeling and verification (by equivalence checking) of asynchronous designs using Circal is
discussed in [1]. It is also shown how the diagnostic facility of the Circal system helps in determining
the forks that are required to be isochronic.
Besides process calculi, a number of other formalisms have been used to model asynchronous circuits
at gate-level: Petri nets [33], signal transition graphs [32], XDI [29], Receptive Process Theory [17],
stable events [16], and complete trace structures [9].
We do not consider here the verification of security properties, because the main focus of the present
paper is the faithful modeling of an asynchronous circuit regardless of its purpose.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we used the LNT language to formally model an asynchronous circuit at circuit- and
gate-level, investigating also various modeling styles for wires and gates. Analyzing these models using
the CADP toolbox, we found that they can provide the designer with valuable information, such as the
necessity to ensure isochrony of forks. For circuit-level analysis, we used an induction proof to extend
results of our attack analysis to a shield of arbitrary size. Obtaining a comparable result for gate-level
models is challenging, due to the necessity of stubs. Last, but not least, we believe that, due to their
extensibility and state space size, these models provide a challenging benchmark.
8Table 1 indicates the size of the sequencers with stubs reduced for divergence-sensitive branching bisimulation. Because
the models PARALLEL and FREE contain livelocks (as a gate might generate outputs not triggered by inputs), there are 16
transitions for RV, III, and IIP (one livelock per state).
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A LNT Models
The LNT model of the shield takes advantage of modules [7] to split the overall model into different
files: a module with the definition of basic data types, a (family of) module(s) for the gates, a module
defining stub processes, and the main module.
A.1 Data Types, Operations, and Channels
Module VOLTAGE defines an enumerated data type for voltages, logical operations (used in the gates),
channels for communicating voltages, and processes to represent wires and (isochronic) forks.
module VOLTAGE is
type VOLTAGE is
DOWN , UP
with "==", "!="
end type
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
function NOT (X: VOLTAGE) : VOLTAGE is
if X == DOWN then
return UP
else
return DOWN
end if
end function
function _AND_ (X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) : VOLTAGE is
case X1 , X2 in
UP , UP -> return UP
R. Mateescu, W. Serwe, A. Bouzafour & M. Renaudin 215
| any , any -> return DOWN
end case
end function
function _OR_ (X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) : VOLTAGE is
case X1 , X2 in
DOWN , DOWN -> return DOWN
| any , any -> return UP
end case
end function
function MULLER (X1, X2 , PREVIOUS: VOLTAGE) : VOLTAGE is
if (X1 == DOWN) and (X2 == DOWN) then
return DOWN
elsif (X1 == UP) and (X2 == UP) then
return UP
else
return PREVIOUS
end if
end function
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
channel LINK is
(VOLTAGE)
end channel
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s t r a i g h t w i r e ( w i t h non−z e r o d e l a y )
−− a l s o u sed f o r mod e l i n g an i s o c h r o n i c f o r k
process WIRE [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] is
var X : VOLTAGE in
loop
INPUT (?X);
OUTPUT (X)
end loop
end var
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− f o r k i n g w i r e r e p l i c a t i n g an i n p u t on b o t h o u t p u t s i n any o r d e r
process FORK [INPUT , OUTPUT1 , OUTPUT2: LINK] is
var X : VOLTAGE in
loop
INPUT (?X);
par
OUTPUT1 (X)
|| OUTPUT2 (X)
end par
end loop
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end var
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− wi r e s t u c k a t a g i v e n v o l t a g e
process STUCKAT [W: LINK] (V: VOLTAGE) is
loop
W (V)
end loop
end process
end module
A.2 Gates
For each modeling style (see Fig. 5), there is dedicated version of the module GATES.
A.2.1 Transition-Oriented Gates
module GATES (VOLTAGE) is
process INV [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X: VOLTAGE) is
−− i n v e r t e r
var RESULT , NEW_RESULT: VOLTAGE in
RESULT := NOT (X);
loop
INPUT (?X);
NEW_RESULT := NOT (X);
if NEW_RESULT != RESULT then
RESULT := NEW_RESULT;
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end if
end loop
end var
end process
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y AND g a t e
var RESULT , NEW_RESULT: VOLTAGE in
RESULT := X1 AND X2;
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select;
NEW_RESULT := X1 AND X2;
if NEW_RESULT != RESULT then
RESULT := NEW_RESULT;
OUTPUT (RESULT)
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end if
end loop
end var
end process
process NOR [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y NOR g a t e
var RESULT , NEW_RESULT: VOLTAGE in
RESULT := NOT (X1 OR X2);
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select;
NEW_RESULT := NOT (X1 OR X2);
if NEW_RESULT != RESULT then
RESULT := NEW_RESULT;
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end if
end loop
end var
end process
process MULLER [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK]
(in var X1, X2, RESULT: VOLTAGE) is
−− Mu l l e r ’ s C e l em e n t
var NEW_RESULT: VOLTAGE in
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select;
NEW_RESULT := MULLER (X1 , X2 , RESULT);
if NEW_RESULT != RESULT then
RESULT := NEW_RESULT;
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end if
end loop
end var
end process
end module
A.3 Intuitive State-Oriented Gates
module GATES (VOLTAGE) is
process INV [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X: VOLTAGE) is
−− i n v e r t e r
loop
INPUT (?X);
OUTPUT (NOT (X))
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end loop
end process
process BINARY [INPUT1, INPUT2: LINK] (in out X1, X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− a c c e p t one o f two i n p u t s
use X1, X2; −− t o k e ep l n t 2 l o t o s s i l e n t
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select
end process
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y AND g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
end process
process NOR [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y NOR g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (NOT (X1 OR X2))
end loop
end process
process MULLER [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK]
(in var X1, X2, RESULT: VOLTAGE) is
−− Mu l l e r ’ s C e l em e n t
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
RESULT := MULLER (X1, X2 , RESULT);
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end loop
end process
end module
A.3.1 State-Oriented Gates
module GATES (VOLTAGE) is
process INV [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X: VOLTAGE) is
−− i n v e r t e r
loop
INPUT (?X);
OUTPUT (NOT (X))
end loop
end process
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process BINARY [INPUT1, INPUT2: LINK] (in out X1, X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− a c c e p t one or two i n p u t s i n a r b i t r a r y o r d e r
use X1, X2; −− t o k e ep l n t 2 l o t o s s i l e n t
select
INPUT1 (?X1);
select
null
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
end select
[] INPUT2 (?X2);
select
null
[] INPUT1 (?X1)
end select
end select
end process
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y AND g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
end process
process NOR [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y NOR g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (NOT (X1 OR X2))
end loop
end process
process MULLER [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK]
(in var X1, X2, RESULT: VOLTAGE) is
−− Mu l l e r ’ s C e l em e n t
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
RESULT := MULLER (X1, X2 , RESULT);
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end loop
end process
end module
A.3.2 Parallel State-Oriented Gates
module GATES (VOLTAGE) is
process INV [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X: VOLTAGE) is
−− i n v e r t e r
loop
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select
INPUT (?X)
[] null
end select;
OUTPUT (NOT (X))
end loop
end process
process BINARY [INPUT1, INPUT2: LINK] (in out X1, X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− a c c e p t one or two i n p u t s i n a r b i t r a r y o r d e r
use X1, X2; −− t o k e ep l n t 2 l o t o s s i l e n t
par
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] null
end select
|| select
INPUT2 (?X2)
[] null
end select
end par
end process
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y AND g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end loop
end process
process NOR [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y NOR g a t e
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
OUTPUT (NOT (X1 OR X2))
end loop
end process
process MULLER [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK]
(in var X1, X2, RESULT: VOLTAGE) is
−− Mu l l e r ’ s C e l em e n t
loop
BINARY [INPUT1 , INPUT2] (!?X1 , !?X2);
RESULT := MULLER (X1, X2 , RESULT);
OUTPUT (RESULT)
end loop
end process
end module
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A.3.3 Free State-Oriented Gates
module GATES (VOLTAGE) is
process INV [INPUT , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X: VOLTAGE) is
−− i n v e r t e r
loop
select
INPUT (?X)
[] OUTPUT (NOT (X))
end select
end loop
end process
process AND [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y AND g a t e
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
[] OUTPUT (X1 AND X2)
end select
end loop
end process
process NOR [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK] (in var X1 , X2: VOLTAGE) is
−− b i n a r y NOR g a t e
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
[] OUTPUT (NOT (X1 OR X2))
end select
end loop
end process
process MULLER [INPUT1, INPUT2 , OUTPUT: LINK]
(in var X1, X2, RESULT: VOLTAGE) is
−− Mu l l e r ’ s C e l em e n t
loop
select
INPUT1 (?X1)
[] INPUT2 (?X2)
[] OUTPUT (RESULT)
end select;
RESULT := MULLER (X1, X2 , RESULT)
end loop
end process
end module
222 Modeling an Asynchronous Circuit for Attack Protection
A.4 Stubs
module STUBS (VOLTAGE) is
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− b e h a v i o u r ( p r o t o c o l ) o f an a s y n c h r o n o u s s e q u e n c e r as g i v e n by a
−− ( s e q u e n t i a l ) s i g n a l t r a n s i t i o n g raph
process PROTOCOL [R_PRED , A_PRED, R_SUCC , A_SUCC: LINK] is
loop
R_PRED (UP);
R_SUCC (UP);
A_SUCC (UP);
R_SUCC (DOWN);
A_SUCC (DOWN);
A_PRED (UP);
R_PRED (DOWN);
A_PRED (DOWN)
end loop
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− p r o c e s s t o a b s o r b r e p e a t e d i n p u t s , t r a n s f o r m i n g a s t a t e −o r i e n t e d
−− mode l i n t o a t r a n s i t i o n −o r i e n t e d one
process ABSORB [W: LINK] (V: VOLTAGE) is
loop L in
select
W (V)
[] break L
end select
end loop
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s t u b p r o c e s s e s e n f o r c i n g t h e s t a t e −o r i e n t e d p r o t o c o l w i t h t h e same
−− g a t e s a s t h e s e q u e n c e r so as t o u s e t h e same c om p o s i t i o n o p e r a t o r
−− t o add a s t u b i n s t e a d o f a d d i n g a s e q u e n c e r
−− c o n t r a r y t o t h e t r a n s i t i o n −o r i e n t e d p r o t o c o l , r e p e a t e d o u t p u t s a r e
−− p e r m i t t e d : t h u s , l e f t and r i g h t s t u b s a r e d i f f e r e n t
process STUB_L [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC , A_SUCC: LINK] is
var V: VOLTAGE in
V := UP;
loop
ABSORB [A_SUCC] (NOT (V));
R_PRED (V); R_SUCC (V); −− immed i a t e p r o p a g a t i o n
ABSORB [A_SUCC] (NOT (V));
A_SUCC (V);
A_PRED (V);
V := NOT (V)
end loop
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end var
end process
process STUB_R [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC , A_SUCC: LINK] is
var V: VOLTAGE in
V := UP;
loop
ABSORB [R_PRED] (NOT (V));
R_PRED (V);
R_SUCC (V);
ABSORB [R_PRED] (V);
A_SUCC (V); A_PRED (V); −− immed i a t e p r o p a g a t i o n
V := NOT (V)
end loop
end var
end process
end module
A.5 Sequencer
module SEQUENCER (GATES , STUBS) is
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− b e h a v i o u r o f a s e q u e n c e r as g i v e n by t h e c om p o s i t i o n o f i t s
−− e l e m e n t a r y g a t e s (AND , NOR , INV , and MULLER) , e x p l i c i t l y mod e l i n g
−− f o r k s by d e d i c a t e d p r o c e s s e s ; an i s o c h r o n i c f o r k i s mode l ed as a
−− wi r e w i t h a t h r e e−p a r t y r e n d e z v o u s on t h e o u t p u t
−− t h e r e a r e e i g h t p r o c e s s e s , one f o r each c omb i n a t i o n o f i s o c h r o n i c
−− and p a r a l l e l ( non− i s o c h r o n i c ) f o r k s
process SEQUENCER_PPP [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 ,
G2, H1, H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED1 , H1 -> AND [R_PRED1 , H1 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 -> FORK [R_PRED , R_PRED1 , R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 -> FORK [A_SUCC , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2]
|| H, H1 , H2 -> FORK [H, H1 , H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_PPI [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 ,
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G2, H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED1 , H2 -> AND [R_PRED1 , H2 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 -> FORK [R_PRED , R_PRED1 , R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 -> FORK [A_SUCC , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2]
|| H, H2 -> WIRE [H, H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_PIP [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G2, H1 , H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED1 , H1 -> AND [R_PRED1 , H1 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 -> FORK [R_PRED , R_PRED1 , R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC2 -> WIRE [A_SUCC, A_SUCC2]
|| H, H1 , H2 -> FORK [H, H1 , H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_PII [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G2, H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED1 , H2 -> AND [R_PRED1 , H2 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 -> FORK [R_PRED , R_PRED1 , R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC2 -> WIRE [A_SUCC, A_SUCC2]
|| H, H2 -> WIRE [H, H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
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process SEQUENCER_IPP [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 , G2, H1 , H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED2 , H1 -> AND [R_PRED2 , H1 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED2 -> WIRE [R_PRED, R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 -> FORK [A_SUCC , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2]
|| H, H1 , H2 -> FORK [H, H1 , H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_IPI [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 , G2, H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED2 , H2 -> AND [R_PRED2 , H2 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED2 -> WIRE [R_PRED, R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 -> FORK [A_SUCC , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2]
|| H, H2 -> WIRE [H, H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_IIP [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G2 , H1 , H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED2 , H1 -> AND [R_PRED2 , H1 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED2 -> WIRE [R_PRED, R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC2 -> WIRE [A_SUCC, A_SUCC2]
|| H, H1 , H2 -> FORK [H, H1 , H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
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−− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − −
process SEQUENCER_III [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G2 , H2: LINK]
(X1, X2, INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G ->
MULLER [R_PRED2 , A_SUCC2 , G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED2 , H2 -> AND [R_PRED2 , H2 , R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G2 , H -> INV [G2, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC2 , H2 -> NOR [A_SUCC2 , H2 , A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| R_PRED2 -> WIRE [R_PRED, R_PRED2]
|| A_SUCC2 -> WIRE [A_SUCC, A_SUCC2]
|| H, H2 -> WIRE [H, H2]
|| G, G2 -> WIRE [G, G2]
end par
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− b e h a v i o u r o f a s e q u e n c e r as g i v e n by t h e c om p o s i t i o n o f i t s
−− e l e m e n t a r y g a t e s (AND , NOR , INV , and MULLER) , u s i n g mu l t i w a y
−− r e n d e z v o u s t o mode l f o r k i n g w i r e s , and a g a t e t o mode l ( b i n a r y )
−− w i r e s
process SEQUENCER_RV [R_PRED , A_PRED , R_SUCC , A_SUCC, G, H: LINK]
(X1 , X2 , INIT_C: VOLTAGE) is
par
R_PRED, A_SUCC , G -> MULLER [R_PRED , A_SUCC, G] (X1 , X2, INIT_C)
|| R_PRED, H -> AND [R_PRED , H, R_SUCC] (X1 , NOT (INIT_C ))
|| G, H -> INV [G, H] (INIT_C)
|| A_SUCC, H -> NOR [A_SUCC , H, A_PRED] (X2 , NOT (INIT_C ))
end par
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s e q u e n c e r w i t h t h e same v i s i b l e i n t e r f a c e as PROTOCOL[]
process SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC, A_SUCC: LINK] is
hide G, H, R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 , G2, H1 , H2: LINK in
SEQUENCER_PPP [R_PRED , A_PRED, R_SUCC , A_SUCC , G, H,
R_PRED1 , R_PRED2 , A_SUCC1 , A_SUCC2 , G2 , H1 , H2]
(DOWN , DOWN , DOWN)
end hide
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s h i e l d w i t h one e l em e n t ( and c l o s e d r i g h t end )
process SHIELD_1 [R0 , A0: LINK] is
hide R1 , A1: LINK in
par R1, A1 in
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SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R0, A0 , R1 , A1]
|| WIRE [R1 , A1]
end par
end hide
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s h i e l d w i t h two e l e m e n t s ( and c l o s e d r i g h t end )
process SHIELD_2 [R0 , A0: LINK] is
hide R1 , A1 , R2 , A2: LINK in
par
R1, A1 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R0 , A0 , R1, A1]
|| R1 , A1, R2, A2 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R1 , A1 , R2, A2]
|| R2 , A2 -> WIRE [R2, A2]
end par
end hide
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s h i e l d w i t h f i v e e l e m e n t s ( and c l o s e d r i g h t end )
process SHIELD_5 [R0 , A0: LINK] is
hide R1 , A1 , R2 , A2, R3, A3 , R4 , A4, R5, A5: LINK in
par
R1, A1 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R0 , A0 , R1, A1]
|| R1 , A1, R2, A2 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R1 , A1 , R2, A2]
|| R2 , A2, R3, A3 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R2 , A2 , R3, A3]
|| R3 , A3, R4, A4 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R3 , A3 , R4, A4]
|| R4 , A4, R5, A5 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R4 , A4 , R5, A5]
|| R5 , A5 -> WIRE [R5, A5]
end par
end hide
end process
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− s h i e l d w i t h t e n e l e m e n t s ( and c l o s e d r i g h t end )
process SHIELD_10 [R0 , A0: LINK] is
hide
R1 , A1, R2, A2 , R3 , A3 , R4, A4 , R5 , A5,
R6 , A6, R7, A7 , R8 , A8 , R9, A9 , R10 , A10: LINK
in
par
R1 , A1 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R0 , A0 , R1, A1]
|| R1 , A1, R2 , A2 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R1 , A1 , R2, A2]
|| R2 , A2, R3 , A3 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R2 , A2 , R3, A3]
|| R3 , A3, R4 , A4 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R3 , A3 , R4, A4]
|| R4 , A4, R5 , A5 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R4 , A4 , R5, A5]
|| R5 , A5, R6 , A6 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R5 , A5 , R6, A6]
|| R6 , A6, R7 , A7 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R6 , A6 , R7, A7]
|| R7 , A7, R8 , A8 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R7 , A7 , R8, A8]
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|| R8 , A8, R9 , A9 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R8 , A8 , R9, A9]
|| R9 , A9, R10 , A10 -> SEQUENCER_HIDDEN [R9 , A9 , R10 , A10]
|| R10 , A10 -> WIRE [R10 , A10]
end par
end hide
end process
end module
B EXP Compositions
This section only presents those composition expressions that cannot be inlined in the SVL script (see
Appendix C).
B.1 Correct Pipelining of Sequencers
In the EXP expression corresponding to a correct composition, the names of the two sequencers have to
be replaced by concrete file names (see also Sect. 3.1). The SVL script (see Appendix C) uses sed to
generate appropriate instances.
hide R, A in
par R, A in
rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in
"%%%C1%%%"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in
"%%%C2%%%"
end rename
end par
To generate more informative diagnostic traces to the deadlocks, it is better not to hide any gates and to
rename the internal gates of the sequencers so as to distinguish between those of the left and right one.
par R, A in
rename
R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A, G -> G_L, H -> H_L,
R_PRED1 -> R_PRED1_L, R_PRED2 -> R_PRED2_L,
A_SUCC1 -> A_SUCC1_L, A_SUCC2 -> A_SUCC2_L,
H1 -> H1_L, H2 -> H2_L
in
"%%%C1%%%"
end rename
|| rename
R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A, G -> G_R, H -> H_R,
R_PRED1 -> R_PRED1_R, R_PRED2 -> R_PRED2_R,
A_SUCC1 -> A_SUCC1_R, A_SUCC2 -> A_SUCC2_R,
H1 -> H1_R, H2 -> H2_R
in
"%%%C2%%%"
end rename
end par
Unsurprisingly, this second composition operator yields larger state spaces, e.g.:
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model forks one sequencer two sequencers
states transitions states transitions
INTUITIVE RV 130 294 651 1707
INTUITIVE PPP 94852 357348 429321272 2443520901
TRANSITION PPP 18136 72974 28586926 189893233
B.2 Short-Circuits
The definition of short-circuits requires synchronization vectors, which are not yet supported inline by
SVL.
B.2.1 Short-Circuit R1-R2
hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, R1R2 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "A1 !UP",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R1R2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R1R2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
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end par
B.2.2 Short-Circuit R1-A1
hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, R1A1 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2 !UP",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "R1A1 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
There are no three-party rendezvous: thus, this attack could also be defined for only two sequencers.
B.2.3 Short-Circuit R1-A2
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hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, R1A2 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "A1 !UP",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R1A2 !UP",
"R1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R1A2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
B.2.4 Short-Circuit R2-A1
hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, R2A1 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1 !UP",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A2 !DOWN",
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_ * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "A1R2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "A1R2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
B.2.5 Short-Circuit R2-A2
As for the short-circuit R1-A1, there are no three-party rendezvous.
hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, R2A2 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1 !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * _ -> "A1 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * _ -> "A1 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
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_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP",
_ * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "R2A2 !DOWN",
_ * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "R2A2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
B.2.6 Short-Circuit A1-A2
hide R1 , A1 , R2, A2, A1A2 in
label par using
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r u nm o d i f i e d w i r e s
"R_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !DOWN",
"R_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "R_PRED !UP",
"A_PRED !DOWN" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !DOWN",
"A_PRED !UP" * _ * _ -> "A_PRED !UP",
"R1 !DOWN" * "R1 !DOWN" * _ -> "R1 !DOWN",
"R1 !UP" * "R1 !UP" * _ -> "R1 !UP",
_ * "R2 !DOWN" * "R2 !DOWN" -> "R2 !DOWN",
_ * "R2 !UP" * "R2 !UP" -> "R2 !UP",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !DOWN" -> "R_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "R_SUCC !UP" -> "R_SUCC !UP",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !DOWN" -> "A_SUCC !DOWN",
_ * _ * "A_SUCC !UP" -> "A_SUCC !UP",
−− s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n v e c t o r s f o r t h e s h o r t − c i r c u i t
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !UP",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
"A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
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"A1 !DOWN" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !DOWN",
"A1 !UP" * "A2 !DOWN" * "A2 !DOWN" -> "A1A2 !UP",
"A1 !UP" * "A2 !UP" * "A2 !UP" -> "A1A2 !UP"
in
rename R_SUCC -> R1 , A_SUCC -> A1 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R1 , A_PRED -> A1, R_SUCC -> R2, A_SUCC -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R2 , A_PRED -> A2 in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
C SVL Script
The following SVL script generates the expected behavior, performs the circuit-level analysis of the
various attacks, and attempts the generation of a pipe-line of two sequencers modeled at gate level, for
each of the various models of wires, forks, and gates.
Running this SVL script on a laptop with an Intel R© CoreTMi5 M560 CPU at 2.67 GHz, 8 GB of
RAM, Debian GNU/Linux 9, and CADP 2019-k (Pisa) in 32-bit mode takes about 15 minutes.
% DEFAULT_PROCESS_FILE=" sequencer.lnt"
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− c h o i c e o f an i m p l em e n t a t i o n o f g a t e s
% SET_MODEL () {
% # "$1" should be one of:
% # FREE , INTUITIVE , PARALLEL , STATE , TRANSITION
% rm -f GATES.lnt
% $CADP/src/com/cadp_ln ${1} _GATES.lnt GATES.lnt
% }
% SVL_RECORD_FOR_CLEAN GATES.lnt
% SET_MODEL TRANSITION
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− p i p e l i n e d p a r a l l e l c om p o s i t i o n o f two s e q u e n c e r s
% PIPE () {
% # $1 : C1 (composant a gauche)
% # $2 : C2 (composant a droite)
% # $3 : C1 ||_{R,A} C2
% sed -e "s/%%%C1%%%/$1.bcg/" -e "s/%%%C2%%%/$2.bcg/" \
% composition.exp > ${SVL_TMP_PREFIX}_composition.exp
% SVL_RECORD_FOR_SWEEP ${SVL_TMP_PREFIX}_composition.exp
"$3.bcg" =
divbranching reduction of
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"${SVL_TMP_PREFIX} _composition.exp" ;
% }
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− c i r c u i t− l e v e l a n a l y s i s
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− g e n e r a t i o n o f s h i e l d s w i t h one , two , and t h r e e s e q u e n c e r s
" PROTOCOL.bcg" = reduction of "PROTOCOL" ;
% PIPE PROTOCOL PROTOCOL PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL
% PIPE PROTOCOL PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
property INDUCTION_BASIS
"PROTOCOL || PROTOCOL = PROTOCOL"
"PROTOCOL || PROTOCOL || PROTOCOL = PROTOCOL"
is
comparison " PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL.bcg" == "PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected TRUE ;
comparison " PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL_PROTOCOL.bcg " == "PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected TRUE ;
end property
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
" STUCKAT_DOWN.bcg" = reduction of "STUCKAT [W] (DOWN)" ;
" STUCKAT_UP.bcg" = reduction of "STUCKAT [W] (UP)" ;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
property STUCKAT (WIRE , VOLTAGE)
"wire $WIRE stuck at $VOLTAGE"
is
−− b o t h s e q u e n c e r s have t o s y n c h r o n i z e on $WIRE a t $VOLTAGE
branching comparison
hide R, A in
par
R, A ->
rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| R, A ->
rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| "$WIRE" ->
rename W -> "$WIRE" in
"STUCKAT_$VOLTAGE.bcg"
end rename
end par
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end hide
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected FALSE ;
−− t h e e m i t t i n g s e q u e n c e r can p u t any v o l t a g e on $WIRE
−− t h e r e c e i v i n g s e q u e n c e r can o n l y g e t $VOLTAGE on $WIRE
% if [ $WIRE = R ] ; then
% OTHER_WIRE=A
% SEND=SUCC
% RECV=PRED
% else
% OTHER_WIRE=R
% SEND=PRED
% RECV=SUCC
% fi
branching comparison
hide R, A in
par
"$OTHER_WIRE" ->
rename "R_$SEND" -> R, "A_$SEND" -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| R, A ->
rename "R_$RECV" -> R, "A_$RECV" -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| "$WIRE" ->
rename W -> "$WIRE" in
"STUCKAT_$VOLTAGE.bcg"
end rename
end par
end hide
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected FALSE ;
end property
check STUCKAT (R, DOWN) ;
check STUCKAT (R, UP) ;
check STUCKAT (A, DOWN) ;
check STUCKAT (A, UP) ;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
property CUT (WIRE)
"wire $WIRE cut"
"(generates warnings about a missing synchronization)"
is
−− b o t h s e q u e n c e r s c a n n o t s y n c h r o n i z e on $WIRE
branching comparison
hide R, A in
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par
R, A ->
rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| R, A ->
rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| "$WIRE" ->
rename W -> "$WIRE" in
stop
end rename
end par
end hide
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected FALSE ;
−− t h e e m i t t i n g s e q u e n c e r can s y n c h r o n i z e on $WIRE
−− t h e r e c e i v i n g s e q u e n c e r c a n n o t s y n c h r o n i z e on $WIRE
% if [ $WIRE = R ] ; then
% OTHER_WIRE=A
% SEND=SUCC
% RECV=PRED
% else
% OTHER_WIRE=R
% SEND=PRED
% RECV=SUCC
% fi
branching comparison
hide R, A in
par
"$OTHER_WIRE" ->
rename "R_$SEND" -> R, "A_$SEND" -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| R, A ->
rename "R_$RECV" -> R, "A_$RECV" -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| "$WIRE" ->
rename W -> "$WIRE" in
stop
end rename
end par
end hide
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected FALSE ;
−− b o t h s e q u e n c e r can s y n c h r o n i z e on $WIRE ,
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−− b u t w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n i z i n g w i t h each o t h e r
−− t h i s k i n d o f w i r e c u t i s u n r e a l i s t i c and n o t d e t e c t e d
branching comparison
hide R, A in
par "$OTHER_WIRE" in
rename R_SUCC -> R, A_SUCC -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
|| rename R_PRED -> R, A_PRED -> A in
"PROTOCOL.bcg"
end rename
end par
end hide
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected TRUE ;
end property
check CUT (R) ;
check CUT (A) ;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
property SHORTCIRCUIT (WIRE1 , WIRE2 , RESULT)
"shortcircuit between $WIRE1 and $WIRE2"
is
"composition_shortcircuit_$WIRE1$WIRE2.bcg" =
branching reduction of
" composition_shortcircuit_$WIRE1$WIRE2.exp" ;
branching comparison
" composition_shortcircuit_$WIRE1$WIRE2.bcg"
>=
"PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
expected "$RESULT" ;
end property
check SHORTCIRCUIT (R1, R2, FALSE) ;
check SHORTCIRCUIT (R1, A1, TRUE) ;
check SHORTCIRCUIT (R1, A2, FALSE) ;
check SHORTCIRCUIT (R2, A1, FALSE) ;
check SHORTCIRCUIT (R2, A2, TRUE) ;
check SHORTCIRCUIT (A1, A2, FALSE) ;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
−− g a t e− l e v e l a n a l y s i s
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
"STUB_L.bcg" = divbranching reduction of "STUB_L" ;
"STUB_R.bcg" = divbranching reduction of "STUB_R" ;
% for MODEL in TRANSITION INTUITIVE FREE STATE PARALLEL ; do
% SET_MODEL $MODEL
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% for FORKS in RV PPP PPI PIP PII IPP IPI IIP III ; do
" $MODEL.$FORKS.bcg" =
divbranching reduction of
gate hide all but R_PRED, A_PRED , R_SUCC , A_SUCC
in "SEQUENCER_${FORKS} (DOWN , DOWN , DOWN)" ;
% SEQ=$MODEL.$FORKS
% PIPE STUB_L $SEQ L_$SEQ
% PIPE L_$SEQ STUB_R L_${SEQ}_R
branching comparison
"L_${SEQ}_R.bcg" == "PROTOCOL.bcg" ;
deadlock of branching reduction of "L_${SEQ}_R.bcg " ;
% if [ $FORKS != RV ] ; then
−− a v o i d t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f l a r g e mode l s
% continue
% fi
% PIPE $SEQ $SEQ ${SEQ}_${SEQ}
deadlock of branching reduction of "${SEQ}_${SEQ}.bcg" ;
% done
% done
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
